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ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS: A CASE STUDY FOR EXPLORING
THE LEGAL AND SOCIETAL IMPERATIVE TO
EXPAND THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Carla L. Reyes*
INTRODUCTION

Of the approximately 400,000 immigration cases pending before
federal immigration courts across the country,' approximately fifty
percent involve pro se respondents.2 Although empirical evidence
shows that a foreign national's chances of receiving a favorable ruling
doubles when an attorney represents him or her in removal
proceedings, a unique confluence of history, legal tradition and policy
climate have restricted immigrants' access to counsel to a ten-day
window in which the immigrant may seek representation of his or her
own choosing at no expense to the government. Although removal
proceedings are, by definition, civil proceedings, they nevertheless
involve physical detention and the possibility of permanent removal
from the United States. These circumstances make the immigration
Adjunct Faculty, Northwest University; Associate,
Perkins Coie LLP; J.D.,
LL.M, Duke University School of Law (2009), MPP, Duke Terry Sanford School of
Public Policy (2009). 1 would like to thank my husband, Mario C. Reyes, for his
unwavering support. I would also like to thank the editors of the University of the
District of Columbia Law Review for hosting and organizing a symposium on this
very important topic.
1 Executive Office of Immigration Review ("EOIR"), Office of Planning
Analysis and Technology, FY 2012 Statistical Year Book, at B2 (Feb. 2013),
availableat http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyl2syb.pdf.. Note that the number
of immigration cases received by EOIR in FY 2012 was 410,753, and the number of
cases has hovered around the 400,000 mark since 2009. Id.
2 Id. at Gl. During FY 2012 a record low of 44% of respondents proceeded
on a pro se basis, however, the number of pro se respondents has ranged between
55% and 44% between 2008 and 2012, for an average of 49.8% for that time period.
*

Id.
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system a unique case study for exploration of the civil right to counsel.
This article argues that, in light of the high stakes involved and the
large obstacles to effective pro se participation, there exists a legal and
social imperative to expand access to counsel in removal proceedings.
This article further evaluates alternative frameworks for effectuating
that right to counsel in light of specific public policy criteria and
recommends the creation of a Court Appointed Special Advocate-type
program implemented through regulatory change.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the historical and
policy considerations behind the current statutory mandate that
immigrants in removal proceedings are entitled only to a ten day
period to find representation at no expense to the government. Part II
argues that compelling reasons exist for expanding access to counsel in
removal proceedings. Part III evaluates three alternatives for
expanding access to counsel in removal proceedings and four possible
implementation methods. Using a public policy analysis methodology,
Part III ultimately recommends a Court Appointed Special Advocatetype program implemented through regulatory change as the
framework and implementation method that best serves immigrants in
removal proceedings under present circumstances. The article
concludes by briefly exploring the jurisprudential and policy lessons
from the case study of removal proceedings and applying them to the
discussion of a right to counsel in civil proceedings more generally.
I.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CURRENT
REPRESENTATION RULE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

A. Immigration Law and Policy in the United States:
A Cycle of Openness and Restriction

From the founding of the United States to the present, roughly 100
million persons have immigrated, nearly 75,500,000 of whom have
done so legally. 3 From the very beginning, immigration law and policy
in the United States has experienced a cycle of relative openness
followed by restriction and resistance. Initially, for example, policy
makers sought to encourage immigration to the United States through
the first naturalization law of Congress, the Naturalization Act of 1790.
Michael C. LeMay, An Overview of Immigration to the United States:
Founding to 1865, in 1 TRANSFORMING AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.
3

IMMIGRATION, 1, 1 (Michael C. LeMay, ed., 2013).
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The Act required only that the immigrant (1) be a free white person,
(2) demonstrate two-year residency in the United States and (3) good
character and allegiance to the United States and its Constitution.4
These very liberal naturalization requirements were quickly tightened
in 1795 and again in 1798 in response to both the large influx of
immigrants resulting from the "Open Door Policy"5 and the beginning
of hostilities with France. 6 As these tensions decreased, immigration
law and policy was again relaxed. The mid-1800s were governed by
naturalization and immigration laws (the first immigration law was
passed in 1819) that focused on a five-year residency requirement,
allegiance to the United States and good moral character requirements that remain important hallmarks of immigration law to
this day.
A second cycle of restriction began in the 1880s when, reacting to
the changing composition of immigrants to the United States, "[a]
plethora of nativist groups emerged after 1880 to use violence and to
politically agitate to restrict immigration." 8 With growing concerns
over the composition of the workforce, reliance on immigrant contract
labor and public health, the period between 1880 and 1920 saw the
enactment of increasingly restrictive federal laws, executive orders and
judicial mandates regulating both newly-arriving immigrants and the
immigrants already within United States territory. 9 World War II
interrupted the immigration policy debate, and the next period of
regulation did not begin until 1945.
The progression of the modern era of immigration law has
similarly followed a cycle of openness and restriction. The period 1945
to 1986 was characterized first by immigrants arriving under the quota
system, and then under the preference system.' 0 Policy discussions
4

Carla L. Reyes, Naturalization Law, Immigration Flow, and Policy, in 1

TRANSFORMING AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION, 145, 149 (Michael

C. LeMay, ed., 2013).
s LeMay, supra note 3, at 1.
Reyes, supra note 4, at 150-5 1.
7 Id. at 152, 162.
8 Michael C. LeMay, An Overview of Immigration to the United States, 18651945, in 2 TRANSFORMING AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION, 1, 11

(Michael C. LeMay, ed. 2013).
9 Id. at 19 (LeMay refers to this period, from 1880-1920, as the "Door Ajar
Era").
10 Michael C. LeMay, An Overview of Immigration to the United States, 19452010, in 3 TRANSFORMING AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION, 1, 1
(Michael C. LeMay, ed. 2013) (dividing immigrants arriving between 1945 and 2010
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were marked by a concern for displaced persons and refugees after
World War II, and for refugees suffering after a variety of armed
conflicts, including those in Cuba, Vietnam, and others." The concern
about how to care for such displaced persons quickly transformed into
a concern for how to stem the mass flow of asylees.12 This reactive
nature of immigration policy led to the passage of the Refugee Act of
1980 which attempted to curb the flow to only those who met the
United Nations definition of refugee and asylee." Further, growing
concern with the problems posed by undocumented immigration led to
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.14
From that time through the present, events such as those that occurred
on September 11, 2001, and trends such as the rising gang problem in
Latin America and armed conflict in the Middle East have led to an
increasingly restrictive and divisive tone for immigration policy and
have stalled efforts at reform in Congress.15
Ultimately, the history of naturalization and immigration law and
policy from the founding of the United States to the present has
informed the judicial process affecting immigrants in removal
proceedings. The trends followed by lawmakers regarding admissions
and other requirements mirror developments on the enforcement side,
causing changes in enforcement priorities,16 changes in jurisprudential
into two groups: "the quota immigrants, who came from 1945 to 1965, and the
preference immigrants, who came since 1965.").
Id. at 4-7.
12

13

Id. at 8.
Id.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 9-13; see also Laura C. Thaut & Carla L. Reyes, Immigration and the
U.S. Liberal Welfare State: Why Mainstream Theories Fail to Explain Patters on
Immigration and Access to Political Mobilization, in 3 TRANSFORMING AMERICA:
PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION, 109, 115 (Michael C. LeMay, ed. 2013) ("The
current immigration policy debate remains heated to such an extent that no
consensus can be sufficiently built to pass comprehensive immigration reform.").
16 Elizabeth Shaffer-Wishner, Post-9/111immigration Policy, National Security
and Human Rights Implications for Muslim Americans, in 3 TRANSFORMING
AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION, 81, 83 (Michael C. LeMay, ed.
2013) (noting "hardened U.S. borders, and hardened attitudes toward foreigners" that
resulted in enforcement priorities for "priority absconders" - "those who had been
ordered to leave the country following visa expiration or other immigration
legislation, but did not");. see also Daniel Kanstroom, 'Passed Beyond Our Aid':
U.S. Deportation,Integrity and the Rule of Law, 35 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF.
95, 95-96 (2011) (noting a new "strong 'national security' and 'crime control'

orientation" in immigration enforcement priorities after legal changes in the 1990s).
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emphasis on identity documentation and credibility determinations,' 7
and generally limiting immigrant access to social and legal assistance
through the imposition of funding restrictions.' 8 These dueling policy
and jurisprudential concerns must be considered when evaluating
whether to appoint legal counsel to immigrants in removal
proceedings, what form of counsel is appropriate, and how to
implement any such policy. If these concerns are ignored, any such
attempt will either fail or result in unforeseen consequences that may
or may not benefit the very immigrants the policy is intended to serve.
B. JurisprudentialInfluence on the Debate:
Removal Proceedingsas Civil Proceedings

The long and cyclical history of immigration law and policy in the
United States has inevitably bled into the jurisprudence governing
removal proceedings. Historians such as Lucy E. Slayer and William
C. Van Vleck have documented decades of criticism aimed at United
States immigration admission, adjudication and deportation
proceedings because "[t]he safeguards of a judicial trial are
conspicuously lacking."' 9 Removal proceedings have always provided
foreign nationals relatively greater protection than admission
proceedings; however, Van Vleck notes that even the procedures for
removal have "appeared to be devised 'with a maximum of powers in
the administrative officers, a minimum of checks and safeguards
against error and prejudice, and with certainty, care and due
deliberation sacrificed to the desire for speed."' 20
Most observers blame the lack of judicial safeguards on the
classification of removal proceedings as "civil" proceedings. As a
general matter, "the law sharply demarcates between the many rights
17 See, e.g., Melanie A. Conroy, Real Bias: How REAL ID's Credibility and
Corroboration Requirements Impair Sexual Minority Asylum Applicants, 24
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 20-27 (2009) (discussing enactment of REAL ID

Act and its effects on credibility and corroboration requirements); Marisa Silenzi
Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act is a False
promise, 43 HARV. J. LEGIS. 101, 126-129, 134-136 (2006) (examining the REAL ID
Act's provisions on corroboration and credibility).
18 Thaut & Reyes, supra note 15, at 115-17.
19 LucY E. SLAYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 136 (1995) (quoting WILLIAM C. VAN
VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENs 241 (1923)).

20 Id. (quoting VAN VLECK, supra note 19, at 224).
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available to criminal defendants and the sinificantly more limited
bundle of protections for civil litigants."' The Supreme Court
addressed the civil nature of removal proceedings as early as 1893,
commenting that such proceedings are "in no proper sense a trial and
sentence for a crime or offense." 22 Notably, this determination
coincided with the "Door Ajar Era" of restrictive United States
immigration policy. 2 3 Courts have continued to use the civil-criminal
divide through the modem era as the basis for determining that certain
substantive and procedural safeguards do not apply in removal
proceedings, including the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel. 24 Notably, such decisions were all initially taken during the
"Door Ajar Era," and then judicially confirmed after a restrictive
policy stance was reinstated by the Immigration Reform and Control
Act. Nevertheless, the civil nature of removal proceedings does not
change the fact that the proceedings must comport with due process
requirements.25 As a result, to the extent that courts have considered

21 Kevin R. Johnson, Gideon v. Wainwright and the Right to Counsel in
Immigration Removal Cases: An Immigration Gideon?, 122 YALE L.J. 2394, 2396
(2013); see also Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at
Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52
ADMIN L. REV. 305, 309 (2000) ("[C]ourts have generally adopted an 'all or nothing'
approach: either immigration proceedings are criminal, in which case the
proceedings are weighted down with the 'cumbersome baggage of criminal
procedure;' or else immigration proceedings are civil, in which case the proceedings
travel lightly and efficiently.") (quoting Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on
Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1330
(1991)).
22 Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
23 See supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
24 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (no right to trial by jury); Mantell
v. United
States, 798 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986) (no right to assistance of counsel under
sixth amendment); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1984) (the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply); United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d
1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying ex post facto challenge to deportation because it "only
applies to criminal laws"); Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1089 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1993) (indicating that double jeopardy does not limit removal proceedings
because they are civil proceedings); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (2d Cir.
1986) (Bill of Attainder Clause does not apply).
25
See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (arbitrary
deportation without right to be heard would violate due process).
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providing procedural safeguards in removal proceedings through
26
jurisprudence, they have done so under the guise of due process.
To date, however, no Court has gone so far as to say that due
process requires that immigrants in removal proceedings be uniformly
appointed counsel. Although many opine that the recent Padilla v.
Kentucky2 7 decision represents a step towards judicially-created
appointed counsel in removal proceedings and an erosion of this this
long history of jurisprudence, 2 the current state of affairs remains far
afield of a regime of appointed counsel.
C. The CurrentPrivilegeof Representation:
Ten Days to Findand Payfor Counsel

The current laws governing immigration proceedings can be found
in the Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 239-245.29 An Immigration
judge presides over removal proceedings, and has the power to
"administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and
cross examine the alien and any witnesses." 30 Generally speaking,
detained foreign nationals facing removal proceedings have "the
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by
counsel of the alien's choosing.. .the privilege of] a reasonable
opportunity to examine the evidence.. .to present evidence.. .and to
cross-examine witnesses..., and [the safeguard that] a complete record
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051-52 & n.5 (Exclusionary Rule applies as a
matter of due process when the fourth-amendment violation would otherwise violate
notions of fundamental fairness); Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1972) (suggesting without holding a due process right to appointed counsel in
deportation proceedings).
27 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
28 See generally, Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13
U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1299 (2011) [hereinafter Markowitz, 2011]; Ronald F. Wright, Padilla
and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515 (2011);
Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky, and the Evolving Right to Deportation
Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEw ENG. L. REV. 305 (2011)
[hereinafter "Kanstroom, Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel"]; Daniel
Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: the
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-And-A -HalfAmendment, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1461 (2011) [hereinafter "Kanstroom, The Right to DeportationCounsel"]; Stephen
H. Legomsky, Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process
Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 ST. Louis U. PUBLIC. L. REV. 43
(2011).
29 Iunigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1226-1254a
(2009).
30 Id. § 240(b)(1).
26
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shall be kept of all testimony and evidence produced at the
proceeding." 3 ' The government, however, only provides ten days
within which the foreign national facing removal proceedings may
obtain counsel.3 2 At the end of ten days, the proceeding will begin,
whether or not the foreign national has successfully obtained
counsel.3 3
Admittedly, immigrant advocates have also used a moderately
successful impact litigation strategy to obtain certain due process
rights for legally admitted foreign nationals facing removal
proceedings. These include the right to be heard,34 the right to have the
immigration judge fully develop the record when the immigrant is not
represented by counsel, 35 and the right to receive competent
translation.36 Advocates have also advanced the rights of detained
unaccompanied minors, 37 and most recently, furthered protection of
immigrants facing criminal proceedings.38
However, impact litigation cannot take the place of improved
legislation and can often have unintended consequences.39 In the case
of removal proceedings, successful impact litigation offers some sense
that immigrants are pushing the system towards whatever measure of
process in removal proceedings is due. Many observers, however,
question whether immigration proceedings are generally still weighted
in favor of the government, with foreign nationals facing significant
31 Id. § 240(b)(4). One commentator asserts that INA § 240(b) codifies the
essential elements of a fair hearing granted to immigrants. Note, The Due Process
Implications of Estoppel Claims in Deportation Proceedings, 60 TEX. L. REV. 61
(1981-82).
32 8 U.S.C.A. § 239(b)(1).
33 Id. § 239(b)(3).
34 Yamataya, 189 U.S. 86; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598
(1953) (holding that once an alien has been admitted to lawful residence, "not even
Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard").
3s Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2000).
36 Amadou v. INS, 226 F.3d 724, 726-28 (6th Cir. 2000).
37 See, e.g., Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, Case No. CV
85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal. 1996), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
immigrants/flores_vmesseagreement.pdf (settlement serves as blueprint for the
rights of unaccompanied minors in immigration custody).
38 See generally, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.
3 Carla L. Reyes, Gender, Law and Detention Policy: Unexpected Effects on
the Most Vulnerable Immigrants, 25 Wis. J. L. GENDER & Soc'Y 301, 309-11 (2010)
(describing the Flores impact litigation and its unintended consequences on detention
policy for unaccompanied minors).
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obstacles to achieving favorable rulings without representation. 40
Further, the empirical evidence shows that immigration proceedings
are so complicated41 that a foreign national's chance of receiving a
favorable ruling doubles when an attorney represents him or her in the
proceedings.4 2 In addition, certain populations of immigrants in
removal proceedings face even greater procedural due process
obstacles by virtue of additional circumstances leading to greater
vulnerability. 43 Armed with an understanding of the unique historical,
legal and policy factors that combined to offer immigrants in removal
proceedings only the privilege of obtaining counsel at their own
expense during a ten-day window before proceedings begin, this article
next evaluates whether the uniquely high stakes and significant
obstacles facing immigrants in removal proceedings compel a different
rule.

40 STEPHEN

H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 653

(4th ed. 2005).
41 Kara Hartzler, Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project,
testimony
before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security
and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives (Feb.
13, 2008) ("Immigration law is often compared in its complexity to the tax code, and
there are many issues on which case law does not yet exist.").
42 Id. at 654. See also, Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Programs for
Immigrants: What They Do, Why They Matter, and How They can be Expanded,
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS (June 2004); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The
State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMM. L.J. 739 (2002);

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM APPROVAL RATES FOR
SELECTED APPLICANTS (1987).
43 Two populations come to mind in particular: mentally ill immigrants in

removal proceedings, and minors (whether unaccompanied or accompanied by a
family member). Although an extensive discussion of the additional and specialized
due process challenges facing these two populations is beyond the scope of this
article, each group deserves additional and specific attention by legislators (and not
just advocates pursuing impact litigation). For further discussion regarding the
challenges facing the mentally ill in removal proceedings, see Sarah Gillman,
Immigration Laws are Cruel to the Mentally Ill, IMMIGR. MATTERS (Apr. 18, 2008);

Cheryl Little, Executive Director, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, testimony
before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security
and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary House e of Representatives, at 89
(Oct. 4, 2007); and Hartzler, supra note 40, at 18. For further discussion of the
challenges facing minors see generally, e.g., Reyes, supra note 39.
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II. HIGH STAKES AND SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES COMPEL
EXPANDED ACCESS TO COUNSEL

Immigrants in removal proceedings face high stakes and
significant obstacles to navigating the procedural issues, language
barriers and complicated questions of law involved in the pursuit of
those high stakes. These high stakes and significant obstacles are
present in all removal proceedings - whether the immigrant is detained
during the proceedings or not. 44 These issues have been documented at
length by others. 4 5 However, it is necessary to touch on these
circumstances briefly here in order to illuminate the current, real and
present need for a solution to the lack of a right to appointed counsel in
removal proceedings.
A. Life and Liberty: Removal ProceedingsInvolve the Highest Stakes

For many immigrants, removal to their country of origin could
result in continued abuse, 46 death, 4 7 separation from family, 48 inability
4
For this reason, this article does not limit its examination of policy
alternatives for providing expanded access to counsel solely to detained immigrants
in removal proceedings. Rather, immigrants in removal proceedings generally,
detained or not, face similar obstacles to fair process and are in need of expanded
access to counsel. This approach admittedly affects the analysis, and therefore should
be stated here as a core policy assumption that informs the methodology employed
below.
45 See generally, e.g. DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW
AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA (2012); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration
Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010); Jill E. Family, A Broader View
of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009).
46 KANSTROOM, supra, note 43, at 15-16 (discussing the abuse suffered by

many deportees in their countries of origin and concluding that "[i]n many countries,

the treatment of deportees has been a serious human rights concern.").
47 Id. at 17 (describing the plight of youth deported to El Salvador who "are
regarded as pariahs, hunted by vigilante squads, and some have been shot down
within days of stepping off the planes from the United States.") (citing Randall

Richard, AP Investigation.: 500,000 Criminal Deporteesfrom America Wreak Havoc
in Many Nations, Oct. 26, 2003, available at http://www.threestrikes.org/ap_12.html;
Margaret Swedish, Gang Violence Spreads through Central America, CENTRAL
AMERICA/MEXICO REPORT, Nov.-Dec. 2003).
48 Jacqueline Hagan, Brianna Castro & Nestor Rodriguez, The Effects of U.S.

Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities. Cross-Border
Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REv. 1799, 1818-22 (2010) (documenting the experience of
families separated by deportation, and noting "[i]f deportees have a spouse or child
in the United States, then they could find themselves in a situation in which they are
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to economically support themselves and their family, 49 and other
similarly high-stake outcomes. Further, many immigrants face
prolonged detention while awaiting the resolution of their removal
proceedings.o With the backlog in the immigration court docket,' the
result is that immigrants pursuing relief in immigration court might
spend many months in an immigration detention center awaiting
adjudication of their claims for relief.52
In concrete terms, each year, the United States Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detains over 311,000
foreign nationals. 5 3 As part of this enforcement effort, ICE oversees
330 adult, nineteen juvenile, and three family detention facilities
nationwide, each of which have an average daily population of over
separated indefinitely from loved ones who may have depended on the deported
family member's earnings."); see also Patrick Manning, As Washington Debates
Immigration, FamiliesDeal with Life After Deportation,Fox NEWS LATINO, Feb. 1,
2013, available at http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/02/01/as-washingtondebates-immigration-families-deal-with-life-after-deportation/
("According
to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, more than 200,000 undocumented
immigrants deported between 2010 and early fall 2012 claim to have children who
are U.S. Citizens.").
49 Hagan, Castro & Rodriguez, supra note 48, at 1814-18 (documenting "the
devastating economic, social, and psychological effects of expanded interior
enforcement on immigrant families and the communities where they live.").
50 Am. Civil Liberties Union Foundation Imnmigrants' Rights Project, Issue
Brief Prolonged Immigration Detention of Individuals Who are Challenging
Removal, at 2 (July 2009) ("Finally lengthy delays in immigration courts, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the federal courts, and the complex nature of
immigration cases also cause many immigrants to languish in detention for months
or even years while they wait for their cases to be decided.") (citing Brad Heath,
Immigration courtsface huge backlog, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2009).
51 See, e.g., Susan Carroll, 'Unreal' backlog of immigration cases crowds
dockets, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 1, 2012, available at http://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Immigration-courts-volume-up- 160-in-3-years4001821.php; Heath, supra note 50; Center for Migration Studies, The US
Immigration Court System: Workload and Due Process Challenges, Feb. 21, 2012,
availableat http://cmsny.org/2012/02/21 /osuna-on-us-immigration-court-system/.
52
AMNESTY
DETENTION
IN

INTERNATIONAL,
THE
USA

JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION

(Mar.
22,
2007),
available
at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.
5
United States Government Accountability Office, Alien Detention
Standards: Observations on the Adherence to ICE's Medical Standards in Detention
Facilities,Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary House of
Representatives, June 4, 2008.
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30,000 detained foreign nationals.5 4 In 2012, ICE deported 409,849
immigrants and returned them to their countries of origin.5 5 Further,
11,000 immigrants were awarded asylum during their removal
proceedings in 2011.56 It is unclear whether these numbers reflect the
many children pursuing asylum under Unaccompanied Alien Child
procedures, 57 or those seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service.
Whether adult or child, whether fleeing persecution and abuse
(asylum, refugee, and SIJ seekers), seeking employment, attempting to
maintain their family as an integrated unit, or simply trying to
implement a choice to live in the United States for whatever reason,
each of the immigrants represented by these statistics has core issues
of life and liberty at stake - physical detention, the possibility of
continued physical abuse and death, and the possibility of relief from
those same possibilities. As one writer noted, "[t]he gravity of the
liberty interest at stake for these respondents cannot be overstated and
has been characterized by the Supreme Court as 'banishment' and the
'loss of all that makes life worth living."' 59 Removal proceedings are
different from most other civil proceedings. 60
54 Id. at 2.
55 Elise Foley,
HUFFINGTON POST,

Deportationhits Another Record Under Obama Administration,
Dec. 22, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/12/21/immigration-deportation n 2348090.html.
56
DANIEL C. MARTIN & JAMES E. YANKAY, ANNUAL FLOw REPORT:
REFUGEES
AND
ASYLEES:
2011,
1
(May
2012),
available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-rfa fr 2011.pdf.
5 For a discussion of asylum cases involving unaccompanied minors, see
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE OMBUDSMAN, ENSURING A FAIR AND
EFFECTIVE ASYLUM PROCESS FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN (Sept. 20, 2012),

available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisomb-ensuringfair-asylum-process-for-uac.pdf.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN,
SPECIAL
IMMIGRANT JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ADOPTION OF BEST
PRACTICES (Apr. 15, 2011), availableat
58

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Citizenship-and-Immigration-ServicesOmbudsman-Recommendation-Special-Immigrant-Juvenile-Adjudications.pdf.
59 Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representationfor Detained Immigrants
FacingDeportation: Varick Street Detention Facility,A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 541, 544 (2009) [hereinafter Markowitz, 2009] (quoting Knauer v. United
States, 328 U.S. 654, 659, 676 (1946); Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 454
(1947) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White , 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922))).
60
Markowitz, 2011, supra note 28, at 1329 (stating "'deportation is
different'... because of its gravity and its close relation to the criminal conviction");
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B. Culture, Language and Education:
Obstacles to FairProcess in Removal Proceedings

Respondents in removal proceedings also face linguistic, cultural,
educational and ethnic barriers to fair process in removal proceedings.
Roughly seventy-eight percent (78%) of immigrants in removal
proceedings require interpretation services.61 In addition, cultural
difference may give those in removal proceedings preconceived
notions about the immigration process, including "misinformation
about U.S. laws and court procedures." 62 Further, cultural differences
may substantively impact the immigrant's pursuit of relief from
removal in immigration court. 63 A low level of education and lack of
familiarity with the legal system may also make it more difficult for
immigrants to proceed pro se or to seek counsel.6 4

KANSTROOM, supra note 45, at 185 ("However, so long as deportation is still

formalistically said to be civil and non-punitive while, in reality, being directly tied
to the criminal justice system and highly punitive in effect, it is a construct worth
developing.").
61 Stephen H. Legomsky, RestructuringImmigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1635, 1653 (2010).
62 American Bar Association, Adult Legal OrientationProgram (LOP),

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/publicservices/immigration/projects-initiatives
/south_texas_pro bono asylumrepresentationproject-probar/adultlegal orientati
onprogramlop.html; see also Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of
Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 359-60 (2011)

("Compounding the lack of legal entitlement to appointed counsel are the distinctive
characteristics of the population facing removal: a relative lack of familiarity with
the legal system; lack of financial resources; language barriers; and general
susceptibility to unscrupulous lawyers.").
63 Scott Rempell, Gauging Credibility In Immigration Proceedings:Immaterial Inconsistencies, Demeanor and the Rule of Reason, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 377,

403 (2011) ("Needless to say, participants in immigration proceedings have
distinctive cultural, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds that may make generalizations
about the significance of demeanor attributes from an American vantage point much
harder to extend to those coming from other countries. An immigration judge might
consider an applicant's failure to maintain eye contact a sign of deception even
though the applicant may simply be adhering to a cultural background that views
direct eye contact as abrasive or disrespectful in certain instances."); see also
Cianciarulo, supra note 17, at 131 ("Cultural differences may also have a strong
impact on an adjudicator's perception of an applicant's credibility.").
6 Matt Adams, Advancing the 'Right' to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9
SEATTLE J. SOC. JusT. 169, 179 (2010).
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These obstacles pose significant barriers to fair process for all
immigrants in removal proceedings, whether represented by counsel or
not. Nevertheless, even to the extent that competent counsel might
assist immigrants in removal proceedings in overcoming these cultural,
educational, ethnic and linguistic hurdles, immigrants in the current
system face a variety of additional difficulties. First, as discussed
above, by regulation, immigrants in removal proceedings have ten
days from the filing of the Notice to Appear to obtain counsel at their
own expense. Notably, "several factors make obtaining quality
deportation defense representation impracticable for many. As a group,
respondents tend to come from working class communities and have
limited financial resources."66 Even where immigrants in removal
proceedings can afford to privately retain counsel, "the best available
evidence points to a serious and growing problem regarding the
availability of legal representation, as well as the quality of such
representations in removal proceedings." 6 7
C. These Circumstances Compel ExpandedAccess to Counsel
in Removal Proceedings

The serious nature of the life and liberty interests at stake in
removal proceedings, especially when combined with the additional
obstacles to fair process involved, compel some form of expanded
access to counsel to all immigrants in removal proceedings, whether
detained pending resolution of their case, or not. When evaluating
possible solutions to this situation, which some have called "[t]he
representation crisis,"68 the difficulties posed by linguistic, cultural,
educational and ethnic barriers cannot be overlooked, and policymakers, academics and judicial officers must remember what
practitioners know all too well - the mere appearance of an attorney on
the respondent's behalf will not alleviate these obstacles automatically,
especially if the quality of the representation is lacking. Removal
proceedings are indeed "different" than other civil proceedings, 6 9 and
those differences not only cry out for expanded access to counsel, but
See supra notes 29-33, and accompanying text.
Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59, at 548.
Id. at 542-543 (citing a variety of studies revealing the abuses of "notarios"
and members of the immigration bar).
61 Id. at 544.
69 Markowitz, 2011, supra note 28,
at 28.
65

66
67
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for expanded access to competent counsel who can assist the
immigrant in navigating both the complex law that will determine key
issues of life and liberty and the complex cultural, educational and
linguistic issues that pervade each immigration courtroom.
III. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR EXPANDED ACCESS TO COUNSEL
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

Any discussion of the policy alternatives for expanding access to
counsel to all immigrants in removal proceedings must address both
the possible content of the system and the form in which the system
will be implemented. In order to balance the historical and political
considerations underpinning the current requirement that immigrants
obtain and pay for their own counsel with the high stakes and
significant obstacles facing immigrants in removal proceedings, this
article recommends a framework that pursues expanded access to
counsel, rather than assuming that appointed counsel will best address
the policy problem. In particular, this article argues that, at present, the
best alternative for providing expanded access to counsel and fair
process in removal proceedings is to implement a Court Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA)-type program. Further, after exploring four
options for implementing such a framework, this article recommends
that the program be developed through regulatory change. In
recommending the proposed framework and implementation method,
this article weighs whether the proposals will meet certain standards to
a high degree, a methodology taken from the field of public policy. 70
A. Standardsfor DesigningProposedFramework
andfor Weighing Implementation Alternatives

The analysis that follows presents several alternatives for a
framework expanding access to counsel in removal proceedings. Each
of these alternatives have been suggested, considered, or otherwise
discussed in the literature regarding a right to counsel in removal
Corresponding to the written analysis that follows, alternatives were
assigned values of 0, 1, 2, or 3 based on how effectively the alternative met each
criterion. The values were then totaled to determine an overall score for each
alternative. For a full scoring breakdown, see Appendices A and B. In the policy
analysis literature, this analytical tool is commonly used and is referred to as an
outcomes matrix. EUGENE BARDACH, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS:
THE EIGHTFOLD PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING xvi (2d ed. 2005).
70
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proceedings. Importantly, the literature surrounding these alternatives
tends to focus on the jurisprudential basis for each position and
whether it fulfills constitutional norms, rather than on the policy
implications of the proposal. Without making a judgment as to the
efficacy of such an approach, this article pursues a different
methodology namely, asking which proposed solution and which
method for implementing that solution best addresses the myriad
aspects of the complicated "representation crisis" and problems
impeding fair process for immigrants in removal proceedings
discussed above when weighed against specific criteria. 7
As part of this methodology, the alternatives for expanding access
to counsel in removal proceedings and the possible implementation
methods are weighed in light of the following standards: (1) maximize
political feasibility; (2) respect due process; (3) enhance transparency;
(4) maximize likelihood of success; (5) enhance judicial economy; and
(6) provide accountability. "Political feasibility" refers to the variety
and number of actors that will support the policy. 72 For the purposes of
this exercise, "due process" refers to the extent to which the
framework for expanding access to counsel respects the immigrants'
interest in receiving fundamentally fair treatment in proceedings which
determine significant questions related to their liberty interests.7 3
7' BARDACH, supra note 70, at 45-47 (summarizing the methodology as
follows: "In a coherent narrative style [the policy analyst] will describe some
problem that needs to be mitigated or solved. [The policy analyst] will lay out a few
alternative courses of action that might be taken. To each course of action [the policy
analyst] will attach a set of projected outcomes that [the policy analyst] think[s his or
her] client or audience would care about, suggesting the evidentiary grounds for [the
policy analyst's] projections. If no alternative dominates all other alternatives with
respect to all the evaluative criteria of interest, [the policy analyst] will indicate the
nature and magnitude of the trade-offs implicit in different policy choices.
Depending on the client's expectations, [the policy analyst] may state [his or her]
own recommendation as to which alternative should be chosen.").
72 Id. at 32 (referring to this criterion as "political acceptability" and defining it
as "a combination of two things: too much opposition (which may be wide or intense
or both) and/or too little support (which may be insufficiently broad or insufficiently
intense or both).").
n Defining "due process" as advancing fair treatment in removal proceedings
is consistent with the focus of the United States Supreme Court when inquiring into
the due process rights of immigrants. See, e.g., Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S.
460 (1912) (holding that a successful attack on immigration hearings must
demonstrate that they were manifestly unfair); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982) (limiting the judicial inquiry to whether deportation procedures meet the
essential standard of fairness under the due process clause). Immigrants do not enjoy
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"Transparency" refers to the degree to which the special procedure can
be made well known and well understood. 74 "Likelihood of success"
refers to whether the alternative will actually achieve the desired level
of fair process for immigrants in removal proceedings. 7 5 "Judicial
economy" refers to the efficiency of the immigration courts, especially
with regard to unnecessary effort, expenses or use of resources. 7 6 The
final criterion, "accountability," is used only to weigh the appropriate
method of implementing the framework for counsel in removal
proceedings, rather than in designing the framework itself.
"Accountability" refers to the ability to enforce the "right" to counsel
provided to immigrants in removal proceedings through the proposed
framework.7 7 The method for implementing the proposed framework
that provides accountability will grant immigrants in removal
proceedings a remedy for deprivation of their "right" to counsel.

the full panoply of due process rights that United States citizens do. Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1883). For example, although detained immigrants are entitled to
an opportunity to be heard, that opportunity is "not necessarily an opportunity upon a
regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that
will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress." Yamataya, 189
U.S. 86, 101; see also Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 598. Detained immigrants are
also entitled to the development of a full record by the Immigration Judge, Jacinto,
208 F.3d 725, and to competent translation. Amadou, 226 F.3d at 726-28. Each of
these rights advance the definition of "due process" above as fair treatment in
proceedings affecting a significant liberty interest.
74 John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption:
The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism,34 BRIT. J. POL. Sc. 295, 316 (2004)

(defining "transparency" as "the availability and accessibility of relevant information
about the functioning of the polity

.... ").

BARDACH, supra note 70, at 33 (labeling this criterion "robustness and
improvability," Bardach explains: "Policies that emerge in practice can diverge, even
substantially, from policies as designed and adopted. A policy alternative therefore
should be robust enough so that even if the implementation process does not go very
smoothly, the policy outcomes will still prove to be satisfactory.").
7

76 J. Stanton Hill, Note, Towards Global Convenience, Fairness,and Judicial
Economy: An Argument in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens
Dismissals Before DeterminingJurisdictionin United States FederalDistrict Courts,
41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1177, 1197 (2008) (linking the concept of "judicial

economy" to the idea of "judicial efficiency").
77 Transparency and Accountability Initiative, Definitions,
http://www.transparency-initiative.org/about/definitions
("Accountability means
ensuring that officials in public, private and voluntary sector organisations are
answerable for their actions and that there is redress when duties and commitments
are not met.").
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B. Access to Counsel: A ProposedFramework
for ExpandingAccess to Counsel in Removal Proceedings

This section presents three alternatives for addressing the
''representation crisis" facing immigrants in removal proceedings.
After evaluating each of the alternatives in light of the criteria set forth
above in Part III A, this article encourages advocates to seek expanded
access to counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings through a
CASA-type program. As will be shown by the analysis set forth below,
the CASA-type program is the alternative that best meets the criteria.
It is important to note the impact of the criterion of political
feasibility,7 8 and to understand that the effect of this criterion on the
analysis varies with the changing political landscape. Consequently,
the analysis below should be updated in light of current conditions
before advocates pursue any strategy for expanding access to counsel
in removal proceedings. Furthermore, the strategy recommended here
is not recommended as the ideal or final solution for expanding access
to counsel in removal proceedings. Rather, it is offered as the policy
choice that is most likely to achieve a real impact for immigrants in
removal proceedings in the near future, and should be viewed as an
interim solution recommended on the basis of the current political,
jurisprudential and cultural climate.
1. Mandatory Participation in an Expanded Legal Orientation
Program
This alternative would expand the current Legal Orientation
Program ("LOP") provided by the Executive Office of Immigration
Review ("EOIR") to certain detention centers throughout the country.
After EOIR initiated several pilot LOP projects on its own, in 2002
Congress appropriated one million dollars to fully develop the
program. 7 9 Despite several expansions of the program, EOIR is still
only able to provide LOP to a portion of detained immigrants.8 0 This
78

In both the analysis of the proposed framework and the implementation

method, the difference between the prevailing alternative and the secondary
alternative is political feasibility.
79 Adams, supra note 64, at 178 (citing Vera Institute of Justice, Legal
Orientation Program Evaluation and Performance and Outcome Measurement
Report, Phase II, at 8 (2008),
available at http://www.vera.org/
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP evalution updated_5-20-08.pdf).
80 Id. (citing Vera Institute of Justice at 27-28).
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alternative would expand funding for the program such that LOP could
be provided to all immigrants in removal proceedings. 8 '
This alternative is moderately politically feasible. The prior
expansions of the program and of funding for the program indicate
significant political support for LOP. However, in light of the present
budget crisis, increased funding for any program is unlikely. 82 if,
however, funding is the issue that would make this alternative more or
less politically feasible, the degree of feasibility will vary with the
changing politics of the time and the ability to create additional
funding sources. For example, at the time of this writing Congress is
considering a proposal for comprehensive immigration reform which
seeks to create a statutory right for all detained immigrants to
participate in LOP within five days of detention. 83 The bill's sponsors
expect the funding for even this moderate increase in the reach of the
LOP program to come from a new fund created by the reform
legislation itself, not from any existing source of funding.8 4 As a
result, advocates pursuing an advocacy strategy should evaluate the
effect of this criterion anew before pursuing any strategy involving an
expanded LOP.
This alternative only minimally satisfies due process and, for
substantially the same reasons, also has a low likelihood of actually
providing sufficient fair process to immigrants in removal proceedings
such that the difficulties discussed in Part I above are alleviated. As
one writer explained, after participating in LOP, "[e]ven those
respondents who understand the substance of the basic charges against
them or those who are advised that they may qualify for an application
81 This alternative is suggested, albeit ultimately rejected, by Matt Adams'
work. Id. at 179 ("Even if all detained respondents in removal proceedings were

guaranteed participation in legal orientation sessions

.... ").

Center for Migration Studies, The US Immigration Court System: Workload
and Due Process Challenges, Feb. 2, 2012, http://cmsny.org/2012/02/21/osuna-onus-immigration-court-system/ (predicting that a budget crisis would prevent funding
for 100 additional immigration judges).
83 A Bill To Provide for Comprehensive Immigration Reform and For Other
Purposes, S. 13500, 113th Cong. § 3502 (2013), available at http://www.schumer.
senate.gov/forms/immigration.pdf.
82

84

Id.

This is Adams' main objection to using LOP as a solution to the representation crisis. "[LOP] can in no way be credited as providing a viable alternative to legal
representation. Even if all detained respondents in removal proceedings were
guaranteed participation in legal orientation sessions, the overwhelming majority
would still be denied fundamentally fair hearings." Adams, supra note 64, at 179.
8

149

for relief, are left with little or no understanding of the intricacies of
the substantive provisions of the law." 86
This alternative only minimally advances transparency. The aim of
LOP is to make removal proceedings more widely known and better
understood. However, given the variance in the linguistic, cultural and
educational backgrounds of the immigrants participating in LOP, it is
unlikely that removal proceedings will be well known and well
understood by many of the participating immigrants. 87
This alternative moderately increases judicial economy. To the
extent that LOP enables immigrants in removal proceedings to better
understand the availability of relief from removal in their particular
case, 88 it may also enable the immigration court to forego delays in the
proceedings. Such delays otherwise stem from the immigration judge
using precious court time to act as both "impartial adjudicator and
counselor to the respondent," 89 or from the preparation (and
subsequent rejection) of improper applications for relief, or from other
continuance requests. 90 However, because LOP prohibits "any legal
representation, including any legal advice and any legal practice or
preparation of forms, even on a limited pro se basis," 9 1 it does not
alleviate the additional time immigration judges must spend
"researching issues without the benefit of counseled briefing." 92
86

Id.

87 Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59, at 551 ("Fifty-two percent of the foreignborn population are limited English proficient. As discussed earlier, they are
disproportionately poor and they are significantly more likely to be lacking in basic
education.") (citing Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Data show
Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-Born Population (Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/american-communitysurvey_a
cs/cb09-cn0 1.html ).
88 Adams, supra note 64, at 179 (noting that "LOP provides substantive assistance that is useful for assisting unrepresented individuals with initially identifying
potential forms of relief

.... ").

Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59, at 544-45 (explaining the difficulties surrounding the fact that "[i]n pro se cases, immigration judges are obligated to
investigate and advise respondents on the availability of potential defenses to
removal.") (citing 8 C.F.R § 1240.11 (a)(2) (2009) ("The immigration judge shall
inform the alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits
89

enumerated in this chapter

.... ")).

9 Id. at 545 ("Pro se cases require more adjournments.
91 Adams, supra note 64, at 178 (citing Stephen Lang, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Legal Orientation Program Protocols Orientation vs.
Representation, Apr. 14, 2009).
92 Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59,
at 545.
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Because expanding LOP to provide mandatory participation for all
immigrants in removal proceedings, is only moderately politically
feasible, does not respect due process, has little likelihood of success,
and only marginally advances both transparency and judicial economy,
this alternative is unlikely the best avenue for pursuing increased
access to counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings. This
alternative received a total score of 4.93
2. Court Appointed Special Advocate-Type Program
This alternative proposes creating a Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA)-type advocacy program, in which volunteers,
whether attorneys or not, are assigned to assist the respondent navigate
the non-legal aspects of removal proceedings. 94 This alternative helps
alleviate the burden suffered by immigrants in removal proceedings
due to the immigration bar's strong disincentives to practice
immigration defense. 95 By creating a volunteer program that is open to
both lawyers and non-lawyers, this alternative enlarges the possibility
that any immigrant in removal proceedings would receive some form
93

See Appendix A: Outcomes Matrix.

94 This alternative is modeled after an initiative begun by Maria Woltjen of the

University of Chicago Law School. In Prof. Woltjen's initiative, volunteers are
assigned to act in a CASA type role on behalf of unaccompanied alien children. See
Jennifer Carnig, Woltjen Brings Immigrant Children's Advocacy Project to Law
School's Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, UNIV. CHIC. CHRON., Sept. 21, 2006, availableat
Note also that others have
http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/060921/woltjen.shtml.
suggested a guardian ad litem program for mentally ill respondents in removal
proceedings. Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the
Madness: The Right to Court Appointed GuardiansAd Litem and Counsel for the
Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings, 16 U. PA. J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (2013).
The alternative proposed here differs from the guardian ad litem proposal as it does
not limit the population of respondents to the mentally ill, and does not propose that
the CASA-type volunteers act as formal advocates before the court (whether for the
respondent's stated interest or the respondent's best interest).
95 Accessing Justice, supra note 62 ("According to the providers surveyed,
detained cases are least served by existing removal-defense providers."); Markowitz,
2009, supra note 59, at 549-50 (discussing financial disincentives for the private
immigration bar to focus its practice on removal defense and the problem of underfunding for pro bono service providers); Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal
Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZo L. REV. 619, 621 (noting
that "there are too few lawyers for poor immigrants in the United States").") (citing
Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 461, 462 (2009); Kerwin, supra note 42, at
1).
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of assistance. The CASA-type volunteers would be charged with:
ensuring immigrants in removal proceedings understand the basic
procedural disposition of their case, 9 6 alerting the immigrants to
possible avenues for obtaining counsel,9 7 assisting the immigrant in
overcoming language barriers (either by finding an appropriate
translator or speaking in the immigrant's native language), 9 8 and if the
immigrant decides to proceed pro se, assisting the immigrant in
obtaining the necessary supporting paperwork for his or her
applications (e.g. coordinating with family members of the immigrant
to obtain identity documents or providing basic research assistance on
country conditions and other similar corroborative evidence).99 As an
outside observer focused on the best interest of the immigrant, the
CASA-type advocate might even serve as a check on poor quality
representation. 0 0
This alternative is quite politically feasible. As a volunteer
program, this alternative would pose no additional cost to the
government. In fact, by alleviating some of the non-legal obstacles
immigrants face in removal proceedings, this alternative advances
judicial economy and might stretch expenditures in the immigration
court system by saving time otherwise devoted to continuances,
prolonged hearings and additional research time an immigration judge

Adams, supra note 64, at 179 (noting the difficulty that immigrants will
have in leaming the procedures of the immigration court on their own).
9
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration
Adjudications through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 56 (2008)
("Many times individuals slated for removal hearings have difficulty procuring
representation because they do not know how to go about finding counsel... and/or
are detained and thus even more limited in their information about and access to
counsel.") (citing Andrew 1. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum
Representation:Ideasfor Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 746 n.53 (2002)).
98 Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59, at 551("Fifty-two percent of the foreignborn population are limited English proficient.").
99 Adams, supra note 64, at 179 ("In addition, without legal representation,
most respondents do not have access to obtain the necessary supporting documents
to appropriately present their cases.").
100 Schoenholtz & Bernstein, supra note 97, at 58 ("The problem is not only
lack of representation but also poor quality of representation... .Some applicants
manage to secure representation, but their representative (1) may not have the
appropriate legal expertise, (2) may be overloaded with too many cases, (3) may not
give due attention and care to individuals, or (4) may even be fraudulent.").
96
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might otherwise need to invest.' 0 1 Taken together, these factors make
this alternative strong in terms of the efficiencies it offers.
This alternative moderately advances due process and, similarly,
has a moderate likelihood of success. By focusing on the nonsubstantive legal barriers to fair process in removal proceedings, this
alternative advances the immigrant's ability to navigate the
proceedings to a strong degree. Nevertheless, given the uniquely
complicated nature of immigration law, many opine that "due process
requires that persons receive direct legal representation in their
removal proceedings."' 02 For such advocates, anything short of direct
legal representation cannot fulfill the promise of due process in
removal proceedings. This alternative also has a strong likelihood of
success in certain situations. Namely, if an immigrant can afford
private counsel, this alternative makes it more likely that the
immigrant can locate quality representation and effectively
communicate with counsel. To the extent a respondent must proceed
pro se, this alternative gives the immigrant non-legal support that he or
she would not otherwise have. This alternative received a value of
10. 103
3. Federally Funded Right to Appointed Counsel
This alternative would recognize a right to appointed counsel in
removal proceedings. Most of the literature surrounding this
alternative focuses on the jurisprudential basis for a constitutional right
to appointed counsel.104 However, such an approach presumes the
method of implementing the policy solution and is not the
methodological approach taken here. Rather, here, this alternative is
evaluated on the basis of its content, standing alone. On that basis it is
101See discussion of these drains on the immigration court system supra notes
88-92 and accompanying text.
102 Adams, supra note 64, at
179.
103 See Appendix A: Outcomes Matrix.
104 See generally John R. Mills, Kristen M. Echemendia & Stephen YaleLoehr, 'Deathis Different' and a Refugee's Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
361, 385 (2009) (arguing that "due process requires free legal representation in
immigration proceedings involving claims for asylum, restriction on removal, and
relief under the CAT."); Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the
Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES
113, 116 (2008) (arguing that "to protect against unlawful detention and the risk of
erroneous deportation, due process requires that detained lawful permanent residents
be appointed counsel.").
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clear that, at least at the present time, this alternative is so lacking in
political feasibility as to render it a less desirable alternative than the
CASA-type program.
First, this approach is not politically feasible. This approach would
require either that Congress pass immigration-related legislation, or
that the judiciary wade into this politically volatile and
jurisprudentially complicated morass of legal issues. Under either of
these avenues, this alternative would require significant funding. Such
funding is a political nonstarter. 0 5 This is true even when, at the time
of this writing, a significant immigration reform bill is seriously being
considered in Congress.
Notably, that bill offers the several provisions on appointed
counsel none of which involve a federally funded right to appointed
counsel. The legislation contemplates a right to appointed counsel for
unaccompanied alien children, for an immigrant in removal
proceedings who is "incompetent to represent himself or herself due to
a serious mental disability that would be included in section 3(2) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990," and for an immigrant who
"is considered particularly vulnerable when compared to other aliens
in removal proceedings, such that the appointment of counsel is
necessary to help ensure fair resolution and efficient adjudication of
the proceedings."l 06 The proposed legislation also authorizes the
Attorney General, in his "sole and unreviewable discretion" to
"appoint or provide counsel to aliens in immigration proceedings." 0 7
This last provision can be read as the best evidence of the current low
level of political feasibility of providing a statutory right to federally
funded appointed counsel in removal proceedings. The current
proposal, the one that negotiations landed upon as the most feasible,
offers far less than a right to appointed counsel for all immigrants in
removal proceedings.
This alternative would otherwise meet the other criteria to a
moderate degree. In principle, appointed counsel would respect due
process, enhance transparency, advance judicial economy and have a
Heeren, supra note 95, at 620-654 (detailing the long history and current
state of restrictions on allowing federal funding to be used for direct representation
of non-citizens); see also Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59, at 550 ("Congress has
made clear its disinclination to fund deportation defense work on a broad scale.").
106 A Bill to Provide for Comprehensive Immigration Reform and for Other
Purposes, S. 13500, 113th Cong., § 3502 (pp. 567-68) (2013), available at
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/forms/immigration.pdf.
107 Id.
105
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strong likelihood of successfully providing immigrants their best
chance at fair process in removal proceedings. 1o Nevertheless, the
ability of counsel to deliver on the promises of this ideal in reality
depends on the quality of representation. 109 For the reasons discussed
at length above, there is as much a crisis of quality in representation
for immigrants in removal proceedings as the crisis presented by the
absence of representation." 0 Ineffective assistance of appointed
counsel will advance none of these goals, and instead would victimize
the very persons this alternative seeks to serve. As a result of the high
level of political infeasibility and the practical obstacles to achieving
the ideal levels of the other criteria, this alternative received a value of
8.111

C. Access to Counsel: A ProposedPoliticallyFeasibleMethod
for Enacting the Framework

Although advocates and academics tend to focus on statutory
reform and impact litigation as the two vehicles for expanding access
to counsel in removal proceedings,112 the immigration system actually
presents at least four methods for implementing the above proposed
framework: (1) memoranda or guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Mills, Echemendia & Yale-Loehr, supra note 104, at 362 (arguing that "[i]n
the current system, many petitioners who are eligible for asylum - and therefore
might face persecution or death after deportation - are being denied relief
erroneously because they lack counsel.").
109 See generally Kaufman, supra note 104, at 149, ("recognition of a right to
counsel would also create a number of practical problems. Finding qualified lawyers
and administrating an appointed counsel system would be an enormous undertaking
108

"0 See supra notes 66, 67, and accompanying text.
11 See Appendix A: Outcomes Matrix.
112 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacon, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration
Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DuKE L.J.

1563, 1623-33 (2010) (exploring both judicial and statutory reforms); David A.
Robertson, Comment, An Opportunity to be Heard: The Right to Counsel in a
Deportation Proceeding, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1032-40 (1988) (arguing for a

claims-based

judicial

approach);

Mark

Noferi,

Cascading Constitutional

Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counselfor Mandatorily DetainedImmigrants
Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012) (arguing for a

judicially created right to appointed counsel for mandatorily detained immigrants);
Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call: Immigrants' Right to Appointed Counsel in
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000) (calling for a

change to the case-by-case approach to appointed counsel in removal proceedings).
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Homeland Security ("DHS") and/or the Chief Immigration Judge; (2)
impact litigation; (3) regulatory change through DHS' rule making
authority; and (4) statutory change. By evaluating each of the four
options against the policy standards discussed above in Part Ill-A, it is
clear that the best method for providing a new framework for
expanded access to counsel in removal proceedings is lobbying for
DHS to effectuate regulatory change.
1. Memoranda or Guidelines
This alternative calls for the content of the special procedures to be
in the form of memoranda and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Director of the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and/or the Chief Immigration Judge.11 3 The
memoranda and guidelines would thus be applicable to government
immigration enforcement officers, detention facility staff, government
attorneys appearing in immigration courts, and immigration judges." 4
Such memoranda and guidelines are not binding law upon these
various actors,'1 5 but are regularly used as methods of creating and
As explained in a recent memorandum from Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, memorandums can confer no substantive rights
because "[O]nly the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, can confer
these rights." Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., et al., on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the
United States as Children, at 3 (Jun. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. Nevertheless, "[I]t remains for the
executive branch, however, to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within
the framework of the existing law." Id. It is in the capacity of setting policy within
the framework of the existing law that the Secretary of Homeland Security and/or the
Chief Immigration Judge, under the auspices of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, have the authority to issue such memoranda.
114 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All
Chief Counsel, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Aliens, at 1 (Jun. 17, 2011) ("This memorandum provides U.S.
113

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel guidance

... "),

available at

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretionmemo.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Id. at 6 ("[T]his memorandum, which may be modified,
superseded, or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not, and
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enforcing new procedures to address issues for groups of detainees
with special needs and situations, such as children and refugees.116
This alternative is highly politically feasible. Memos and
guidelines are created directly by the Secretary of Homeland Security
or the Chief Immigration Judge and are circulated as operating
procedures internal to the agency." 7 As a result, the number and
variety of actors that are necessary to support the alternative are
reduced to a minimum and advocates would only need to center their
lobbying efforts on several key players within DHS in order to
implement special procedures in the form of a memo or guideline.
This alternative only marginally enhances transparency. The use of
internal memoranda or guidelines to promulgate procedures for
allowing immigrants in removal proceedings greater access to counsel
will not enhance transparency to a high degree because it does not lend
itself to being well known and well understood. Unlike case law,
regulations or statutes, internal immigration memos are not collected
and systematically presented in reporters of any kind."18 The problem
posed by this failure to collect and present important policy
memoranda and guidance is clear in the context of immigrants in
removal proceedings: how are immigrants to access justice in removal
proceedings if the rules applicable to them are based on internal,
unpublished memoranda?
This alternative provides no accountability. Any procedures
contained in a memorandum are unenforceable procedures"l 9 in the
sense that failure to abide by a memorandum does not provide
immigrants a remedial right. In light of its status as unenforceable
agency guidance, the memorandum, at best, might be used as

may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.").
116 See, e.g., Memo from Janet Napolitano, supra
note 113.
117 See, e.g., Memo from John Morton, supra note
114, at 1.
118 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services do provide a listing of memoranda on its website. See Immigration Policy and Procedural Memoranda, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextoid=7dc68f236el6e01 OVg
nVCMOOOOOOecdl90aRCRD&vgnextchannel=7dc68f236el 6e010VgnVCM100000
0ecdl9OaRCRD. The U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. ("DHS") website offers no
similar listing. The Am. Immigration Lawyers Assoc., does, however, offer a
repository of DHS memoranda on their website. See AILA InfoNet,
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=8412.
"9 See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 114, at 6.
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persuasive authority on appeal as a tool for advocating that the
judgment of the lower court was incorrect.
Because this form of special procedures only marginally advances
the goals of due process, transparency, and provides no accountability,
it is unlikely to provide the desired level of access to counsel for
immigrants in removal proceedings. This alternative receives a total
score of 6.120
2. Impact Litigation
This alternative envisions attorneys obtaining greater access to
counsel for immigrants in removal proceedings by carving out
fundamental rights through impact litigation. Such litigation could
draw from case law on the right to counsel in other civil contexts and
on the recent Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.12 1 Such
strategies are well documented,1 22 and tend to coincide with
substantive proposals for a federally funded right to counsel.
This alternative is only marginally politically feasible. Although
this alternative limits the number and variety of actors necessary to
achieve expanded access to counsel for immigrants in removal
proceedings, it introduces new legal difficulties in interpreting due
process provisions as they relate to foreign nationals.123 What makes
this strategy for implementation problematic is that "the law is well
settled in this area and the judiciary has given no indication in recent
years that it is inclined to revisit the issue."' 24 Although some have
argued that the Padilla Court took the first step toward shaking up this
well-settled jurisprudential principle,125 the Court's pronouncements to
that effect only carry the weight of dicta.' 2 6 The Court's failure to
directly issue any holdings on the issue indicates, at minimum, a
continuing reluctance to revisit the civil-criminal divide and the
See Appendix B: Outcomes Matrix.
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
122 See generally, e.g., Noferi, supra note 112; Kanstroom,
The Right to Deportation Counsel, supra note 28; Stephen H. Legomsky, Transporting Padilla to
Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 31 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 43 (2011).
123 See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 45 (investigating the limits of the
law applicable to foreign nationals, including time and territory).
124 Markowitz, 2009, supra note 59,
at 547.
125 Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel,
supra note 28; Markowitz,
2011, supra note 28, at 1301.
126 Markowitz, 2011, supra note 28,
at 1331.
120

121 Padilla
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resulting effect on an immigrant's right to counsel in removal
proceedings. This reluctance is similarly reflected by the Court's recent
decisions on appointed counsel in civil proceedings generally.' 27
Using impact litigation as the form for expanding access to counsel
in removal proceedings will significantly respect due process because
a federal court would determine the balance between the national
interest in safeguarding the immigration system and the immigrant's
personal interest in receiving fundamentally fair treatment in
proceedings involving his or her liberty. However, judicially created
law is always subject to judicially created revisions and the level of
expanded access to counsel achieved via impact litigation is thus
vulnerable to volatility.
Impact litigation will also significantly enhance transparency, as
case law is regularly published and systematically made available.
However, judicially created law is not always the most clear or best
crafted form of law' 2 8 and a pronouncement about the boundaries of
an immigrant's right to counsel in removal proceedings given in this
fashion may suffer from significant ambiguity. The potential for such
ambiguity and the possibility that judicially created procedures will
later be judicially overturned indicate that this alternative only
marginally provides accountability and has low likelihood of success.
This alternative receives a total score of 7. 129

127

See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (the

14 1h

Amendment's "Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of
counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a
child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year)").
Notably, a district court recently granted a permanent injunction recognizing that
detained immigrants with mental disabilities facing deportation and who are unable
to adequately represent themselves in immigration proceedings are entitled to a
qualified representative in their removal proceedings. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder,
CV-10-2211-DMG (C.D. Cal., Apr. 23, 2013), available at http://www.aclusc.org/franco-injunction/. Although an important milestone as the first decision to
recognize a right to appointed counsel for any class of immigrants in removal
proceedings, the limited scope of its application belies the point argued above
namely, that the judiciary is unlikely to wade into the abyss of recognizing appointed
counsel for all immigrants in removal proceedings in the near future.
128 Jerome A. Barron, The Ambiguity of Judicial Review: A Response to
Professor Bickel, 1970 DUKE L.J. 591 (1970) ("There is an abundance of alternative
doctrine in American case law which makes generalized prediction hazardous.").
129 See Appendix B: Outcomes Matrix.
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3. Regulatory Change
Under this alternative, DHS would implement regulations that
reflect the proposed framework discussed above. DHS is competent to
promulgate such implementing guidelines under its authority as the
regulatory agency in charge of administration and enforcement of
immigration law.13 0 This alternative is moderately politically feasible
because the promulgation of regulations is an agency decision, rather
than a decision that must withstand the political process. However, the
rule-making process requires a period of notice and comment, and it is
possible that opposition to the new regulations could arise during that
time. 131
This alternative both respects due process and enhances
transparency to a high degree. Immigration regulations are
promulgated at 8 C.F.R. et seq., and are presented there systematically.
All parties to immigration proceedings are aware of the regulations:
the DHS attorneys, the immigration judge, and the immigrant (whether
via counsel, LOP or instruction from the immigration judge). To the
extent that the promulgated regulations are ambiguous, the agency
may issue further guidance.1 32
Furthermore, this alternative meets the criterion of providing
accountability to a high degree. Addressing the "representation crisis"
through regulations creates a norm of enforceability, whereby the
parties to an immigration proceeding will expect to be held
accountable if the respondent is denied the access to counsel
prescribed. Lastly, this alternative has a high likelihood of success. A
regulation will likely provide the intended level of access to counsel
for immigrants in removal proceedings because it will provide a clear,
accessible, and understandable procedure for accessing counsel when
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Rulemaking, http://www.dhs.gov/dhsrulemaking ("In many cases, DHS carries out its mission through the promulgation
of regulatory actions.").
13 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
132 Bryan C. Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide
and Seek: What
Agencies Can (and Can't) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1687, 1692
(2011) ("Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The agency follows with
regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards
and the like. Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance or
memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in
the regulations.") (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020
(D.C. Cir. 2000)).
130
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faced with proceedings in immigration court. This alternative receives
a total score of 14.133
4. Statutory Change
This alternative would require statutory change implementing
expanded access to counsel in removal proceedings as proposed above
as a matter of federal law. The level of political feasibility will be tied
to the scope of the proposed statutory expansion of access to counsel.
For example, a general right to appointed counsel for all immigrants in
removal proceedings is likely a political nonstarter.' 34 A more limited
proposal focusing, for example, on special and/or politically
sympathetic subsets of immigrants in removal proceedings, may gain
more traction. 135
Despite this significant difficulty with expanding access to counsel
through federal statutory change, this alternative otherwise meets the
remaining criteria to a high degree. A statute might best offer respect
for the due process concerns of immigrants in removal proceedings
because it can be carefully crafted and considered. Furthermore, this
alternative enhances transparency because a federal statute would
make the access to counsel a major and accepted part of immigration
law that will both be well known and well understood.
In addition, this alternative has a strong likelihood of successfully
achieving the desired level of fair process for immigrants in removal
proceedings because attorneys and judges would be forced to respect
and enforce the new law. Finally, a statute will provide immigrants
opportunity to seek redress if access to counsel is denied, making this
alternative one that also advances accountability to a high degree. This
alternative receives a total score of 12.136
133 See

Appendix B: Outcomes Matrix.
Markowitz, 2011, supra note 28, at 1357 (noting that criminal aliens are a
group that "garners almost unrivaled political disfavor"); Noferi, supra note 112, at
74 (suggesting that unless the immigrants at issue in the legislation are asylum
seekers, mentally disabled or juveniles, the legislation is not politically viable).
13 The possibility that a more limited provision will gain more traction is
being tested at the time of this writing by provisions in a comprehensive immigration
reform proposal currently being considered by congress. See A Bill to Provide for
Comprehensive Immigration Reform and for Other Purposes, S. 13500, 113th Cong.,
§ 3502 at 567-68 (2013), available at hhttp://www.schumer.senate.gov/
forms/immigration.pdf.
136 See Appendix B: Outcomes
Matrix.
134

161

CONCLUSION

The long, cyclical history of naturalization and immigration policy
and the jurisprudence that mirrors it stands as a significant, but not
insurmountable, barrier to implementing a policy that provides
immigrants in removal proceedings expanded access to counsel. The
largest hurdle to clear is devising a politically feasible system and
implementing it through effective, yet fairly uncontroversial, means.
As a result, a federally funded immigrant public defense bar is likely
not a mandate that will be issued by either legislators or the judiciary
any time soon. This article instead suggests that advocates consider a
CASA-type program, implemented through regulatory change, not as
the perfect, or even best, method to providing immigrants access to
counsel in removal proceedings, but as a starting point for exploring
creative policy solutions to a real and present need. In other words, the
deeper value of the proposal presented here is its ability to engender
discussion and critical thinking around creative solutions to assist
detained immigrants facing high stakes and significant obstacles to
proceeding pro se.
Furthermore, in light of what this exercise has revealed about
providing meaningful access to counsel in removal proceedings, it is
also clear that advocates and academics should consider creative
solutions to providing the broader class of indigent persons access to
counsel in civil proceedings. The government cannot fund everything,
and the five decades since Gideon v. Wainwrightl3 7 have demonstrated
a lack of political will to advance indigent access to counsel in civil
proceedings. Perhaps then, in the interest of serving those in need of
assistance, it is time that we put on our policy hats and explore creative
solutions rather than stand firmly but statically upon claims of
constitutional rights and an unattainable ideal standard.

13

Gideon v. Wainwright, 327 U.S. 335 (1963).
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APPENDIX

A: OUTCOMES MATRIX - FRAMEWORK FOR EXPANDING
ACCESS TO COUNSEL

Alternatives for Expanded Access to Counsel in Removal Proceedings
Outcomes Matrix: Proposed Framework'
Alternatives
CASA-Type
Right to Appointed
Criteria
Mandatory LOP
Program
Counsel
Political Feasibility
2
3
0
Due Process
0
2
2
Transparency
2
1
2
Likelihood of Success
0
2
2
Judicial Economy
1
2
2
Total
5
10
8
I1assign point values of 0 (low), 1, 2, or 3 (high based on how effectively the alternative meets
each criterion.
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APPENDIX

B: OUTCOMES MATRIX - IMPLEMENTATION METHOD

Alternatives for Expanded Access to Counsel in Removal Proceedings
Outcomes Matrix: Implementation Method'
Statutory
Impact
Regulatory
Aternatives
Memo or
Criteria
Guidelines Litigation
Change
Change
Political Feasibility
3
1
2
0
Due Process
1
2
3
3
Transparency
1
2
3
3
Likelihood of Success
1
1
3
3
Accountability
0
1
3
3
Total
6
7
14
12
1Iassign point values of 0 (low), 1, 2, or 3 (high based on how effectively
the alternative neets each criterion.
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